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Introduction
Over the last decade, numerous scholars and commentators have
labeled the Roberts Court as a “pro-business” Court. 1 There are various
reasons why the label seemed to stick, such as the success rate of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the Court as well as anecdotal evidence
based on particular cases. 2 In addition, systematic empirical evidence
suggests that the Roberts Court has decided in favor of business litigants more frequently than under previous Chief Justices going back to
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1.

E.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. Times Mag. (Mar. 16, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html [https://
perma.cc/RBF9-X9CV]; see also infra Part I.A (describing the emergence of
the Roberts Court’s pro-business reputation).

2.

E.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19roberts
.html [https://perma.cc/L8ZX-F8BC] (describing the Roberts Court as an
activist court that favors business interests); see also infra Part I.A.
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at least the 1940s. 3 Despite the development of this conventional wisdom, some commentators question how pro-business the Court really
is. 4 Various legal scholars have argued that when one actually analyzes
the Court’s doctrine, the impact for big business appears far less favorable. 5 Although we agree that close attention should be paid to doctrine
and even different issue areas involving business and economics, we ultimately take a different approach. We draw from the “political regimes” (or “regime politics”) in the political science literature on the
Court to provide a more robust understanding of how it gradually became more business-friendly over time as a result of the influence of
conservative politics, beginning long before John Roberts was installed
as the seventeenth Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. However,
while the Court has been influenced by the predominant values of a
“New Right Regime,” it also reflects another key characteristic of the
regime—division and polarization. 6 To show how these changes have
occurred over time, we analyze cases based on the issue areas of economic regulation and labor union activity, as opposed to whether a
business entity won or lost as a party to the case. Although this
approach cannot tell us the doctrinal effects of the Court’s decisions, it
at least provides a general picture of whether the Court favors government regulation of the economy and unions on the one hand, and businesses and employers on the other.
In Part I, we review the assessments of the Roberts Court’s orientation toward business to provide some context for the debate. First,
we discuss the emergence of the conventional wisdom that the Roberts
Court is pro-business, and then we briefly review the arguments of those
who are skeptical of those claims. In Part II, we summarize the political
regimes approach for understanding Supreme Court decisions and legal
change in the Court. We also discuss how the politics of a “New Right
Regime” have been influenced by conservativism, but at the same time
are characterized by a long period of divided government and polarization. In Part III, we analyze data from the Supreme Court’s decisions
involving economic regulation and union activity from 1946 through
the end of the 2015 term of the Supreme Court. We conclude that since
the beginning of the Burger Court, the Court has increasingly voted in
3.

Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares
in the Supreme Court, 97 U. Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 1471 (2013).

4.

E.g., Robin S. Conrad, The Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business
Bias, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 997, 1000 (2009) (arguing that favorable
decisions for businesses under the Roberts Court are the product of “impartiality and fairness,” not a bias toward businesses); see also infra Part I.B.
(discussing detractors from the majority opinion that the Roberts Court is
pro-business).

5.

See infra note 32 and accompanying text.

6.

For our discussion on the effects of the “New Right Regime” on the Supreme
Court, see infra Part II.A.
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what might be called the “conservative” direction—i.e., against economic regulations and labor. Additionally, the Court frequently divides
along both ideological and partisan lines in these cases, reflecting the
regime in which is it situated.

I. Assessments of the Roberts Court as “Pro-Business”
In this Part we briefly summarize the emergence of a new conventional wisdom about the Court—namely, that it is decidedly probusiness. Just a few years after John Roberts assumed the Chief Justiceship, journalists and scholars were writing about what seemed to be
a new pro-business disposition in the Court. Part I begins by reviewing
some of those claims. In the last section of this Part, we consider some
of the critics or skeptics of those claims.
A. The Emergence of a Conventional Wisdom: The Roberts Court is
Decidedly Pro-Business

By now, the Roberts Court’s reputation as a pro-business Court
has become something like the conventional wisdom for Supreme Court
scholars and commentators. In 2008, Jeffrey Rosen wrote an article
titled Supreme Court, Inc. in New York Times Magazine. 7 Rosen argued that, whereas the Court had embraced a form of “economic populism” throughout most the latter half of the twentieth century, by the
2000s it had transformed into a decidedly pro-business venue. 8
A generation ago, progressive and consumer groups petitioning the
court could count on favorable majority opinions written by justices
who viewed big business with skepticism—or even outright prejudice.
The economic populist William O. Douglas, a former New Deal crusader
who served on the court from 1939 to 1975, once unapologetically announced that he was “ready to bend the law in favor of the environment
and against the corporations.” 9
Today, however, as Rosen pointed out, “there are no economic populists on the court, even on the liberal wing.” 10 In addition to quoting
pro-business statements from members of the so-called liberal wing of
the Roberts Court at the time, Rosen noted that, when compared to
prior years, the proportion of cases involving business interests was up
about ten percent during the early years of the Roberts Court. 11 Rosen
7.

Rosen, supra note 1.

8.

See id. (arguing that while, historically, the Supreme Court “viewed big business with skepticism,” the birth of the Roberts Court in 2005 created a
Court that was “more receptive to business concerns”).

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.
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also highlighted several cases involving antitrust law, corporate mergers, punitive damages, and product liability in which the interests of
big business seemed to be faring well in the Court. 12
These cases didn’t seem to split the Roberts Court along conventional ideological lines. In a 2009 law review article, Rosen reported
that, when he asked Justice Stephen Breyer about the Court’s probusiness orientation, “he did acknowledge that there might be a difference between constitutional cases, where Justices have strong preconceptions and philosophical commitments, and more technical, statutory
cases, where they are more open-minded and amendable to argument.”13
Finally, Rosen explained the pro-business shift as a function of a
decades-long effort by conservative and business groups to counter the
effects of consumer groups and public interest litigation groups like
Public Citizen. 14 In particular, he credited the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s lobbying efforts and the National Chamber Litigation Center,
established in 1977, for advocating business interests in state and federal courts. 15 Various examples and statistics indicated that through
filing amicus briefs on behalf of business interests, the Chamber was
successful both in persuading the Court to grant certiorari and on the
merits in particular cases.
Although Rosen’s article garnered much attention, he was not the
only journalist or commentator claiming the Court was “probusiness.” 16 For example, writing for Bloomberg Business, Michael Orey
declared that the Roberts Court was “open for business.” 17 And in an
article in the Wall Street Journal, Brent Kendall explained that the
Supreme Court is “making it easier for companies to defend themselves

12.

See id. (emphasizing the important consequences of “shareholder suits, antitrust challenges to corporate mergers, patent disputes and efforts to reduce
punitive-damage awards and prevent product-liability suits”).

13.

Jeffrey Rosen, Santa Clara Law Review Symposium: Big Business and the
Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 929, 933 (2009).

14.

Rosen, supra note 1.

15.

Id.

16.

See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 2 (discussing the role of the Chamber of Commerce and its success in state and federal courts); Robert Barnes & Carrie
Johnson, Pro-Business Decision Hews to Pattern of Roberts Court, Wash.
Post (June 22, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/06/21/AR2007062100803.html [https://perma.cc/R76J-9XJP]
(finding a pattern of pro-business decisions by the Roberts Court).

17.

Michael Orey, The Supreme Court: Open for Business, Bloomberg Bus.
Wk. (July 8, 2007), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2007-07-08/
the-supreme-court-open-for-business [https://perma.cc/2KWH-C5JK].
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from the kinds of big lawsuits that have bedeviled them for decades.”18
Some legal academics agreed. For instance, Erwin Chemerinsky wrote
that “the Roberts Court is the most pro-business Court of any since
the mid-1930s.” 19 All of this attention to the Roberts Court and its
business decisions led to further academic research and scholarship
examining whether and to what extent the Roberts Court could be
considered “pro-business.” 20
Much of the early characterization of the Roberts Court as “probusiness” has been based on specific Supreme Court decisions, such as
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 21 and Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 22 or specific Supreme Court terms, such as the 2006 term in which
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce won in thirteen of the fifteen cases in
which it had filed a brief. 23 Nonetheless, there have also been more
systematic analyses of the Court and its disposition toward business
interests. Lee Epstein, William Landes, and Richard Posner conducted
one of the most well-known systematic empirical analyses of the Supreme Court and business interests. 24 In their study, Epstein, Landes,
and Posner selected Supreme Court decisions from the 1946 term
through the 2011 term of the Court in which a business entity was a
litigant. 25 They analyzed the likelihood that business entities would
prevail in the Court over time. 26 Controlling for numerous factors, they
concluded:

18.

Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Comes to Defense of Business, Wall St. J.
(June 23, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732399
8604578563501419972228 [https://perma.cc/NN3X-H689].

19.

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 Wayne L. Rev.
947, 962 (2008).

20.

See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 13, at 929 (discussing the relationship between
the Roberts Court’s pro-business decisions and the conservative legal movement); Business and the Roberts Court (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016)
(including writings from prominent legal scholars concerning the Roberts
Court’s business-related jurisprudence).

21.

550 U.S. 618, 642–43 (2007) (holding that the statute of limitations barred
recovery from the corporate defendant in an employee’s sex discrimination
lawsuit to recover lost wages for unequal pay).

22.

552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (holding that a medical device manufacturer that
satisfied federal Food and Drug Administration standards could not be sued
under state tort law, because the federal regulations preempted the state tort
law).

23.

E.g., Rosen, supra note 13, at 933.

24.

Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3.

25.

Id. at 1434.

26.

Id. at 1437–48.
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Whether measured by decisions or Justices’ votes, a plunge in
warmth toward business during the 1960s (the heyday of the
Warren Court) was quickly reversed; and the Roberts Court is
much friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist
Courts, which preceded it, were. The Court is taking more cases
in which the business litigant lost in the lower court and reversing
more of these—giving rise to the paradox that a decision in which
certiorari is granted when the lower court decision was antibusiness is more likely to be reversed than one in which the lower
court decision was pro-business. The Roberts Court also has
affirmed more cases in which business is the respondent than its
predecessor Courts did. 27

Thus, the Epstein, Landes, and Posner empirical study seems to confirm the conventional wisdom.
B. Detractors and Skeptics Question the Conventional Wisdom

Although there has been much commentary and analysis regarding
the pro-business orientation of the Roberts Court, not everyone has
jumped aboard the bandwagon. There are several different reactions to
the conventional wisdom that the Robert Court is pro-business. For the
sake of illustration, we consider just a few of those reactions here.
Some resist the characterization of the Roberts Court as pro-business altogether. For example, writing in 2009, Robin Conrad, while serving as the Executive Vice President of the National Chamber Litigation Center, called the “pro-business” characterization of the Roberts
Court a “myth.” 28 She argued that none of the analysis showed that the
Justices were trying to favor businesses, but rather, “the recent business
victories are the byproduct of the Justices’ and business community’s
shared preferences for uniformity over conflicting legal regimes and for
predictable laws and regulations.” 29
A more common reaction is to accept that, at a very general level,
the Roberts Court can be characterized as pro-business insofar as it has
accepted more cases involving economic and business issues. 30 At an
aggregate level, the Court had ruled in favor of business interests more

27.

Id. at 1471.

28.

Conrad, supra note 4, at 1000.

29.

Id. at 997.

30.

See James Surowiecki, Courting Business, New Yorker (Mar. 7, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/07/antonin-scalias-corporateinfluence [https://perma.cc/Y56B-XXD8] (“The Roberts Court hasn’t just
made a lot of pro-business rulings. It has taken a higher percentage of cases
brought by businesses than previous courts, and it has handed down farreaching decisions that have remade corporate regulation and law.”).
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frequently than some past historical periods. 31 Acceptance of the general
trends, however, may not tell much about specific areas of the law or
doctrinal developments. For instance, in his analysis of environmental
cases, Jonathan Adler concludes that the Roberts Court is just as likely
to rule in favor of government regulation of the environment as it is in
favor of business groups who oppose such regulations. 32 And in other
areas of the law, the Court may be less interested in whether business
wins than some other dimension of legal decision-making. For example,
in his analysis of securities law, Adam Pritchard concluded that the
justices in the Roberts Court were not particularly interested in the
substantive legal issues involved in most securities litigation, but instead focused on other aspects of those cases: “There are vigorous debates among the justices in some of these cases, but they revolve around
questions of statutory interpretation and the relationship between the
judiciary and the administrative state.” 33
Another issue involves more general limits to quantitative analysis.
In particular, the Epstein, Landes, and Posner study has been viewed
as problematic for some because of the methodology used to simply
code whether a business entity won or lost a particular case and aggregate the results. 34 As Adler argues, such an approach “doesn’t account
for the content of the decisions or the doctrinal baseline. As a consequence, a court may actually produce probusiness decisions that are less
business friendly than decisions deemed ‘antibusiness.’” 35 Under this
logic, one is compelled to ask if the Roberts Court is limiting a cause of
action against businesses. But if that cause of action was only first
recognized twenty years ago, how can anyone conclude that the Court
is being more pro-business than the Court of twenty-five years ago? 36

II. The Roberts Court and the Political Regime
This Part turns to a different approach to analyzing the Roberts
Court and cases involving business or economics issues. Although we
31.

Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 1447–48.

32.

See Jonathan H. Adler, Business as Usual? The Roberts Court and Environmental Law, in Business and the Roberts Court 287 (Jonathan H. Adler
ed., 2016) (discussing the Roberts Court at the intersection of environmental
regulation and business interests).

33.

A. C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court, in Business and the
Roberts Court 94, 95 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016).

34.

See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 1435 (describing the methodology behind the creation of the dataset in the Epstein, Landes, and Posner
study).

35.

Jonathan H. Adler, Introduction to Business and the Roberts Court
1, 7 (Jonathan H. Adler, ed., 2016).

36.

Id.
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agree with our academic lawyer colleagues that we should be ever
mindful of the limitations of quantitative research in this area, as political scientists we think that having a general overview of trends on
the Court is a good starting point for the analysis. However, we also
take a different approach for our analysis of the Roberts Court than
that of Epstein, Landes, and Posner. We draw from political regimes
theory as a basis for understanding how legal change on the Supreme
Court connects to broader political trends. As Pickerill has shown,
trends on the Supreme Court in business and economics cases have
occurred over several decades. 37 In short, as the American polity became
more conservative after the elections of 1968 and 1980, so did the Supreme Court. 38 And, thus, we should expect the Court to reflect those
broader conservative, and pro-business, forces. The period of time since
1968, however, has also been characterized by ideological and partisan
polarization. 39 So, we argue the best way to understand the Roberts
Court’s decisions is as a function of a mostly conservative, but also
highly polarized regime. In the first Section, we examine emergence of
a New Right Regime, defined by the conservative economic policies of
Republican Ronald Reagan and the moderation of the Democrats’
approach to economic policy under Democrat Bill Clinton. In the
second Section, we note that while the regime became more conservative over time, it also became more closely divided and polarized on
ideological and partisan grounds, both of which influenced the direction
of the Supreme Court in economics and business cases.
A. The Roberts Court and the “New Right Regime”

Law and court scholars have shown that elected political elites often
support judicial power for many strategic purposes. 40 Thus, the Court
is not simply a counter-majoritarian institution that thwarts the will of
democratically elected officials. 41 Borrowing from the original insights
of Robert Dahl, these scholars have identified numerous ways in which
the Court is fundamentally connected to the elected branches of the
federal government, demonstrating that the role of the Court in the
37.

See J. Mitchell Pickerill, Something Old, Something New—Something
Borrowed, Something Blue, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1063 (2009) (dis]cussing
reasons for the Supreme Court’s trend toward hearing more business and
economic-based cases).

38.

Id. at 1084–99.

39.

See id. at 1067–68 (“[C]ommentary about the Roberts Court oftentimes
focuses on the ideological direction of the Court’s decisions.”).

40.

See, e.g., id. at 1064.

41.

See generally Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the
Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 933 (2001)
(analyzing the counter-majoritarian perspective on legal scholarship and
judicial review).
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U.S. political system cannot properly be characterized as countermajoritarian. 42 Instead, during any given historical period, the Court
42.

See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957) (“To consider the Supreme Court of the United States strictly as a legal institution is to underestimate its significance in the American political system.”). For a normative
defense of a “political Court” that plays an active role in national policymaking, see generally Terri Jennings Peretti, In Defense of a
Political Court (1999). In expanding on Dahl’s research, scholars have
shown, for example, that elected officials might promote judicial policymaking in order to avoid responsibility for making controversial policy
choices. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35, 37–45 (1993) (discussing legislative deference to the judiciary); see also George I. Lovell,
Legislative Deferrals 42–67 (2003) (providing examples of judicial
policymaking, where the legislative process fails). Moreover, elected officials
might also benefit from judicial review as a way to overcome entrenched
interests or legislative obstructionists. Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose
Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review
by the United States Supreme Court, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 583, 583–86
(2005) (explaining one purpose of judicial review is to overcome an
obstructionist legislature). The Court may also manage divisions or cleavages
within their own political coalition, such as when Democratic presidents
during the 1940s–1960s encouraged the Court to reform American race relations as a way to circumvent opposition from powerful southern Democrats
who controlled Congress. See generally Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren
Court and American Politics (2000) (analyzing the Supreme Court at
the intersection of American politics as a truly co-equal branch of government);
Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the
Development of American Constitutional Law (2004) (discussing how
civil liberties and individual rights relate to political reform); Kevin J.
McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the Presidency
Paved the Road to Brown (2004) (describing judicial appointments as a
means to meet a legislative end). Finally, elected officials might also want to
empower courts as a way of entrenching policies and programs that they
believe are becoming vulnerable to new or emerging electoral majorities. See
generally Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Guess What Happened
on the Way to Revolution? Precursors to the Supreme Court’s Federalism
Revolution, 34 Publius: J. of Federalism 85 (2004) [hereinafter Clayton
& Pickerill I] (rejecting portrayals of the Supreme Court as an autonomous
entity that is independent from the effects of broader political dynamics);
Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice:
How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice
Jurisprudence, 94 Geo. L.J. 1385 (2006) [hereinafter Clayton & Pickerill II]
(describing judicial review as a tool to repeal outdated legislation); Howard
Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 511 (2002) (explaining the historic use of federal courts to entrench
economic policies that were otherwise vulnerable to electoral politics);
Thomas Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The
Road to Modern Judicial Conservatism (2004) (tracing the origins of
contemporary judicial conservatism); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian
Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491 (1997)
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operates as part of the political regime in which it exists. At a macrolevel, then, we should expect the Court’s outcomes to be consistent with
the dominant values and policy preferences of the regime. In doing so,
the Court assures the commitments of the political branches are generally credible. 43 The political regimes literature has shown how Supreme
Court decisions are often connected to specific patterns of party politics,
group coalition building, critical elections, the policy agenda of elected
officials, and other features of the regime. 44 For example:
A political regime is identified as existing during a discrete historical period in which institutional arrangements and processes
have distinct characteristics and remain relatively stable. Most
notably, the period is characterized by a dominant electoral
coalition associated with a particular political party as well a [sic]
coherent policy agenda . . . . The life of a regime is marked by
the construction of a new regime that replaces an old regime,
reaches a zenith, and then unravels until another new regime
replaces it . . . . At the beginning of a regime, presidents and
other political leaders define and articulate the major values of
the regime . . . . 45

Part of this process involves constructing new constitutional and legal
meanings to validate the new agenda. 46 Not surprisingly, the Supreme
Court may eventually be called on to advance and extend these values. 47
Although a political regime is characterized by stability in institutional arrangements and political order, regimes are dynamic, and
(criticizing the use of judicial review to undermine majority rule). For a
comparative perspective, see generally Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism
(2004) (arguing that political elitism and judicial power, not commitments
toward democracy, drive constitutionalism).
43.

See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875 (1975)
(explaining the judiciary’s relationship with other branches of government
through empirical analysis).

44.

For an overview of “political regimes” or “political construction” literature,
see Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci.
425 (2005) (discussing the evolution and emergence of modern-day judicial
review); see also Howard Gillman, Courts and the Politics of Partisan
Coalitions, in The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 644 (Keith
E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008) (discussing new approaches to understanding
how the law organizes, exercises, and protects political power).

45.

J. Mitchell Pickerill, Is the Roberts Court Business Friendly? Is the Pope
Catholic?, in Business and the Roberts Court 50–51 (Jonathan H.
Adler ed., 2016).

46.

Id. at 51.

47.

Id.
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political and legal changes occur within—as well as across—regimes.
Political change is often the result of a process of what Carmines and
Stimson have called “issue evolution.” 48 According to issue evolution
theory, changes in the political system are rarely created by the swift,
seismic event; political change often takes place more gradually through
“dynamic evolution of new issues.” 49
The historical course of change evolves during a political regime
and can be thought of as occurring during a cycle in which political
institutions and actors find themselves in different inter-relationships
in the regime, and with varying opportunities, levels of power, and
constraints or limitations on that power—Stephen Skowronek labels as
this cycle “political time.” 50 For example, reconstructive presidents
stand in opposition to the agenda and values of a declining regime, and
they possess greater opportunities to articulate and reconstitute the
political order. 51 Articulation presidents are from the same party as the
dominant party of the regime and are committed to regime values at a
time when the regime remains dominant. 52 Preemptive presidents are
opposed to the dominant political party, agenda, and values at a time
when the regime remains strong. 53 They are therefore constrained in
their abilities to effect change. They will often find themselves having
to find ways to neutralize key cleavage issues between their party and
the dominant party, and much of their success may be defined by their
ability to moderate the more extreme policies and stances in the existing
regime. 54 Lastly, disjunctive presidents hold office during the twilight
of a declining regime. 55 They are usually blamed for political, economic,
48.

See generally Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, Issue
Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics
(1989) (introducing the theoretical framework of “issue evolution” to understand political changes through the biological theory of natural selection).

49.

Id. at 158.

50.

Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership
from John Adams to Bill Clinton 49–52 (2d ed. 1997).

51.

E.g., id. at 62–85, 130–54, 198–227, 288–324, 414–29 (discussing the presidencies of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin
Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan).

52.

E.g., id. at 86–109, 155–76, 228–59, 325–60, 429–42 (discussing the presidencies of James Monroe, James Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson,
and George H.W. Bush).

53.

E.g., id. at 43–45 (discussing the presidencies of John Tyler, Andrew
Johnson, Woodrow Wilson, and Richard Nixon).

54.

E.g., id. at 45–49 (discussing the presidencies of Woodrow Wilson, Dwight
Eisenhower, Calvin Coolidge, and Grover Cleveland).

55.

E.g., id. at 110–27, 177–96, 260–85, 361–406 (discussing the presidencies of
John Quincy Adams, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Herbert Hoover,
and Jimmy Carter).
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or social problems as the once-dominant coalition is falling apart, and
they provide an easy target for reconstructive presidents as they build
a new dominant electoral coalition, shatter the old regime, and
reconstitute the regime. 56
The Supreme Court exists within political time, too. According to
Keith Whittington, “[t]he Court does not exist outside of political time,
but rather both helps determine political time and occupies a position
within it.” 57 Reconstructive presidents often face a hostile Court, appointed by the previous regime, and are thus committed to that regime’s
agenda and values. 58 In time, reconstructive presidents will successfully
transform the Court through appointments or other mechanisms and
reorient it to support new regime values. 59 As Whittington acknowledges, “[t]he politics of reconstruction hinges on the ability of the president to bolster his authority to define the new regime and to wrest
control over the definition of the constitutional order from other political actors, including the judiciary.” 60
On the one hand, the Court may even “be used as a foil to enhance
the president’s own authority,” in part because “[p]olitically isolated,
judges make a particularly good representative of the old, discredited
commitments and entrenched interests.” 61 On the other hand, preemptive presidents find themselves in a very different position relative to
the Court. Preemptive presidents are not usually “in a position to
launch the reconstructive project. Preemptive presidents will instead
have to pick their shots.” 62 These presidents often are “reformers within
their own party,” finding ways to neutralize cleavage issues that have
hurt their party’s electoral bids “by blurring party distinctions and
offering themselves up as a moderate administrator of the consensus
ideology.” 63 Therefore, these presidents will not be in a very strong
position to challenge the Court, but may find ways to support the Court
in the name of consensus or moderation.
Elsewhere, we have argued that a “New Right Regime” emerged
over a period of time beginning in the late 1960s, solidifying itself with

56.

Id. at 39–41.

57.

Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional
Leadership in U.S. History 75 (2007).

58.

Id. at 72.

59.

Id. at 73.

60.

Id. at 76.

61.

Id. at 77.

62.

Id. at 161.

63.

Id. at 162.
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the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. 64 A full review of the rise of the
New Right regime is unnecessary here. In sum, as the New Deal coalition of northern and southern Democrats became increasingly fragmented, especially over civil rights in the 1960s, the Republican Party
capitalized on those divisions and seized on issues intended to poach
some members of that coalition, especially southern Democrats. 65 Beginning with Richard Nixon’s “southern strategy,” and culminating in the
election of Ronald Reagan, Republicans were able to exploit the fissures
in the Democratic party, begin defining several emerging cleavage issues, sharpen the differences between themselves and the Democrats,
and court the voters who eventually became known as “Reagan Democrats.” 66 Reagan was elected and is viewed as a reconstructive president—replacing many of the values and commitments of the New Deal
Regime with more conservative values and commitments.
What is important for our purposes here is that Reagan advocated
a pro-business agenda that included deregulation, tax relief, and supplyside economics as a core component of the New Right Regime. 67 Reagan
and his Republican allies sought to replace what they viewed as an antibusiness agenda with a more business-friendly agenda. 68 Although much
of Reagan’s agenda was opposed by Democrats in the 1980s, Democratic
elites’ views on economic regulation and business shifted to a more
moderate and consensus position by the 1990s; it was a key issue that
had been a cleavage issue between Democrats and Republicans and
which Clinton—a preemptive president—managed to neutralize. 69

64.

See Clayton & Pickerill I, supra note 42 (describing the revival of federalism
in the 1960s as a result of shifting politics and party platforms); Clayton &
Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1386.

65.

See Clayton & Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1395–99 (explaining how “the
GOP [drove] a wedge deep into the New Deal Democratic political coalition,
separating its southern Democratic congressional base from its more progressive presidential electoral party”).

66.

Id. at 1395–1403.

67.

See Clayton & Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1390–91 (describing how
Republicans expanded federal court power “to protect pro-business, laissezfaire economic policies that were threatened by the rise of Progressive
political power”).

68.

See id. at 1389–90 (describing the Supreme Court under President Raegan
as a mechanism to codify conservative business principles that favored businesses).

69.

Jon F. Hale, The Making of the New Democrats, 110 Pol. Sci. Q. 207, 207
(1995).
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In 1992, Bill Clinton ran as a “New Democrat,” 70 and the unofficial
campaign slogan was “It’s the economy, stupid.” 71 Clinton attempted
to neutralize several key cleavage issues that seemed to plague the Democrats’ presidential candidates in three successive presidential elections.
One of those was the perception that Democrats were for “big government” and anti-business. As the 1992 Democratic Platform made clear,
Clinton and his supporters advocated for a new economic policy:
Just as we have always viewed working men and women as the
bedrock of our economy, we honor business as a noble endeavor
. . . . We believe in free enterprise and the power of market forces.
But economic growth will not come without a national economic
strategy to invest in people. 72

Thus, in 1992, Clinton set out to neutralize what had been a losing
issue for the Democrats, and, by the end of his presidency, deficit reduction and the promotion of free trade were widely regarded as two of
Clinton’s most significant accomplishments. 73
And so by the 1990s, a type of consensus had emerged across party
lines on economic policy. 74 Excessive government regulation of the economy and business was disfavored; economic growth, deficit reduction,
and free trade had become widely agreed upon objectives of political
elites in the national government. 75 There is good reason to believe this
political consensus might influence law and migrate to the Court.
Scholars have chronicled the rise of conservatism as a political force
influencing the direction of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, mostly
as a result of judicial appointments. 76 As far as the Supreme Court is
70.

Id. at 224–28 (describing Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign as a movement
against Raegan economics, designed to unify the Democratic party).

71.

Jerry Jasinowski, It’s the Economy, Stupid, Huffington Post: The Blog
(Nov. 5, 2016, 9:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-jasinowski/
presidential-debates_b_8478456.html [https://perma.cc/UM6T-LW7C].

72.

Political Party Platforms: 1992 Democratic Party Platform, Am.
Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid
=29610#axzz1b7MdZItj [https://perma.cc/4LWX-6GCD] (last visited Mar.
3, 2017).

73.

See Alex Waddan, Clinton’s Legacy? A New Democrat in Governance 44–68 (2002) (describing the Clinton Administration’s approach to
economic reform). For a broader range of perspectives on the Clinton legacy,
see generally The Clinton Legacy (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman
eds., 2000) (chronicling economic policies under the Clinton Administration).

74.

See Waddan, supra note 73, at 46–59 (describing Clinton’s efforts to craft
an economic policy that prioritized deficit reduction).

75.

Id.

76.

See, e.g., Clayton & Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1388–94 (chronicling the
political construction of judicial power).
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concerned then, we would expect Reagan-Bush judicial appointees to
support at a general level the commitments and policies of the New
Right Regime. It is well documented that Reagan and his advisors, to
whom Reagan delegated great authority over judicial appointments,
“had a more coherent and ambitious agenda for legal reform and judicial selection than any previous administration.” 77 According to David
O’Brien, “[i]ndisputably, Reagan’s Justice Department systematically
and effectively infused its legal policy goals into the judicial selection
process.” 78 The appointment of conservative judges was greatly facilitated by the growing conservative legal movement, which promoted conservative legal values through various conservative foundations, think
tanks and related groups, such as the Olin Foundation, the Federalist
Society, the Law and Economics Center, the Center for Individual
Rights, and the Institute for Justice. 79
Reagan’s judicial appointments have been deemed his “best legacy,” in large part because federal courts gradually became more conservative and supported the conservative legal agenda. 80 The Reagan
judicial strategy has mostly been identified with an effort to reverse the
liberal activism in the Warren and early Burger Courts, and especially
with salient social issues, such as prayer in public schools, abortion, and
crime. 81
It is important to remember, however, that a key part of Reagan’s
legal policy agenda was related to his economic policy agenda.
According to Steven Teles, the “first conservative public interest law
firm, the Pacific Legal Foundation” which was founded in 1973 in
California while Reagan was Governor was an effort to counter liberal
Public Interest Law Firms (PILFs). 82 This was because “[c]onservatives
77.

David M. O’Brien, The Reagan Judges: His Most Enduring Legacy?, in
The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance 60, 62 (Charles O.
Jones ed., 1988).

78.

Id. at 67.

79.

See generally Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal
Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (2008) (explaining
the history of the conservative legal movement and the impact of law and
economics on the creation of governmental and nongovernmental organizations); Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Ideas with Consequences: The Federalist Society and the Conservative Counterrevolution (2015)
(detailing the impact of the Federalist Society on public policy and the role
of the judiciary).

80.

O’Brien, supra note 77, at 60.

81.

See David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees 133–35 (1999)
(describing Reagan’s efforts to cultivate conservative decision making within
the courts).

82.

Teles, supra note 79, at 60–61.
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in government, especially Ronald Reagan during his stint as governor
of California from 1967–1975, found their agenda obstructed by liberal
PILFs.” 83 The law and economics movement emerged as an approach
to law in which the primary objective of law is economic efficiency,
which then migrated into elite law schools such as the University of
Chicago, Yale University, Harvard University, and beyond. 84 Not surprisingly, Supreme Court appointments by Reagan and both Bushes
could be expected to subscribe to these views on law and economics.
But what may be just as important for thinking about the Supreme
Court and cases involving economic policy is the place that President
Clinton occupied in the regime. Clinton was a preemptive president
who moderated the positions of his party in order to neutralize or
preempt important cleavage issues that had disadvantaged Democrats
at the polls in three previous national elections. Clinton appointed Ruth
Bader Ginsburg to replace Justice White, and a year later Stephen
Breyer to replace Justice Harry Blackmun. 85 Both of these selections
were considered “safe” in the sense that they were viewed as judicial
moderates, and both were acceptable to Orrin Hatch, Republican of
Utah, the ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 86
According to Michael Gerhardt, Clinton decided not to pursue nominees on ideological grounds, but instead “on the grounds of their appeal
to certain constituencies, age and health, and likelihood for confirmation.” 87 Although both of Clinton’s nominees were easily confirmed,
Silverstein notes that “[t]he ease with which both Ginsburg and Breyer
gained Senate approval must not obscure the degree to which their
appointments were the product of political conflict and weakness.”88
Clinton’s appointments to the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer, reflected his more moderate position on the issues
he had worked to preempt and avoided difficult partisan fights.
And thus, by the time John Roberts was appointed to replace Chief
Justice Rehnquist in 2005, issues involving business and economic regulation were not significant cleavage issues in national politics. Given the
GOP legal and judicial strategy to transform law to reflect conservative

83.

Id. at 60.

84.

Id. at 181–216.

85.

Yalof, supra note 81, at 199–205.

86.

Orrin Hatch, Square Peg: Confessions of a Citizen Senator 180
(2002).

87.

Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis 76 (2000). See also Yalof, supra
note 81, at 196–205 (explaining President Clinton’s appointment strategy for
both Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg).

88.

Mark Silverstein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme
Court Confirmations 121 (2d ed. 2007).
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policy priorities, and both Clinton’s more moderate approach to economic policy and the appointment of more centrist justices to the Supreme Court, we should expect over this time period the Court would
adopt positions less favorable to government regulation of the economy,
and thus more favorable toward businesses and employers. Although it
is possible to trace the development of a New Right Regime as an explanation for trends in economics and business cases as a function of that
regime, there’s another fact of American government during the New
Right Regime that must be accounted for: division and polarization.
B. The Regime and the Court in an Era of Divided Government
and Polarization

While American electoral history is generally understood as a series
of “party systems” or “political regimes” brought about by “critical” or
“secular” realignments that produce a dominant party coalition that
governs for a period of time and then declines to be replaced by a new
electoral order, 89 the period since 1968 is different. During the 1960s,
the New Deal electoral coalition, which dominated American politics
since the 1930s, slowly unraveled over a series of issues including race
and civil rights reforms. 90 As we discussed in the previous Section, beginning with Nixon’s “southern strategy” in 1968, and culminating in
the “Reagan Revolution” in the 1980s, the GOP capitalized on fragmentation within the Democratic Party and brought disaffected southern
Democrats, religious evangelicals, and other groups into a more conservative coalition which consequently became a more competitive force
in national elections. 91 As we explained in the previous Section, the
“New Right” has had important impacts on the direction of political
and policy agendas, including on attitudes toward the regulation of the
economy and business.

89.

See generally Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the
Mainsprings of American Politics (1970) (analyzing critical elections in
U.S. history where a critical realignment predicated an abrupt coalitional
change among the electorate); Skowronek, supra note 50 (analyzing the
impact of various U.S. presidents on the evolution of modern politics); 1
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991) (analyzing the
interplay between the legislature, the executive, and the judicial branches,
as well as the subsequent impact on U.S. policies).

90.

See generally Carmines & Stimson, supra note 48 (considering the transformation of the American political order based on the emergence of racial
politics).

91.

Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government:
Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988 (1990) (detailing the
rise of the GOP, as well as growing partisanship in a divided government).
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In hindsight, however, it is clear that neither 1968 nor 1980 were
anything like classic realigning elections. 92 Rather than the emergence
of a party coalition that was as stable and dominant as previous coalitions (such as the New Deal Coalition), electoral politics during this
period have remained closely divided for an extended period and the
parties have become ideologically more sorted and polarized. 93 This has
led to alternating partisan control of electoral institutions and divided
government. Indeed, between 1968 and 2016, Democrats have won five
presidential elections and Republicans seven. 94 Divided government,
where one party controls the presidency and the other controls one or
both houses of Congress, has prevailed in thirty-eight of the past fortyeight years. 95
Although control of the presidency has been split between the
parties, opportunities to fill vacancies on the Supreme Court have not.
Of the sixteen justices appointed since 1968, twelve were appointed by
Republicans and only four by Democrats. 96 While partisanship has not
92.

See Byron E. Shafer, The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of
Modern American Politics 26–38 (2003) (contrasting the elections from
1948 through the 1990s to identify which elections reflected a “new political
order” of partisan loyalties).

93.

See generally Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged
Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy (2010) (finding that
party loyalty today is based more on ideological beliefs rather than social
group identification, resulting in increased political polarization and higher
voter turnout); Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How
Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans (2009) (explaining how American voters have rapidly realigned themselves based on ideological commitments); Nolan McCarty, Keith T.
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of
Ideology and Unequal Riches (2006) (examining voter polarization in
recent decades and its relationship with wealth disparity, immigration, and
other social forces).

94.

The GOP won presidential elections in 1968 and 1972 (Richard M. Nixon),
1980 and 1984 (Ronald Reagan), 1988 (George H. W. Bush), and 2000 and
2004 (George W. Bush). Democrats won in 1976 (Jimmy Carter), 1992 and
1996 (Bill Clinton), and 2008 and 2012 (Barack Obama). 1789–2016 Presidential Elections, Nat. Archives and Records Admin., https://www.
archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/votes/ [https://perma.cc/
97MJ-9QD4] (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).

95.

See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, U. S. House of
Representatives: Hist., Art & Archives, http://history.house.gov/
Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ [https://perma.cc/3BK2-285B]
(last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (detailing party divides in the U.S. House of
Representatives over time); Party Division, U. S. Senate, https://www
.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/86RH-CMFP] (last
visited Apr. 6, 2017) (chronicling party divisions in the U.S. Senate).

96.

GOP appointments include: Warren Burger (1969–86); Harry Blackmun
(1970–94); Lewis Powell (1972–87); William Rehnquist (1972–2005); John
Paul Stevens (1975–2010); Sandra Day O’Connor (1981–2006); Antonin
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always been a predictor of a justice’s behavior on the bench, the current
era’s more ideologically rigorous nomination process has produced a
Court where justices vote predictably along partisan/ideological lines. 97
The GOP’s advantage in filling vacancies on the Court, including the
appointment of the last three chief justices, has thus led to a more
conservative Court, but, at the same time, the alternating control of
government has created one that is deeply divided and polarized. Indeed, the Roberts Court in 2016 consisted of four Democratic appointees who voted in a liberal direction, four Republican appointees who
voted in a conservative direction, and a ninth seat that remained vacant
and was the subject of fierce partisan conflict in the 2016 presidential
election. 98
And so this extended period of divided government and polarization
overlapped with the emergence of a New Right Regime that sought to
replace the old New Deal Regime. 99 The upshot of this overlap is that
Reagan conservatives were able to influence law and politics in a
conservative direction, but the New Right coalition was fragile from the
beginning. 100 It was never able to fully consolidate power in the ways
majority coalition in previous regimes (such as the New Deal coalition
and regime) had. 101

Scalia (1986–2016); Anthony Kennedy (1987–present); David Souter (1990–
2009); Clarence Thomas (1991–present); John Roberts (2005–present); and
Samuel Alito (2006–present). The Democratic appointees include: Ruth
Bader Ginsburg (1993–present); Stephen Breyer (1994–present); Sonia Sotomayor (2009–present); and Elena Kagan (2010–present). Members of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Supreme Court of the U.S., https://
www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/45KJYAF4] (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).
97.

See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics
of Judicial Appointments 60–65, 130–37 (2005) (explaining how recent
presidential appointments ensure that the appointee’s ideological beliefs align
with the appointing president’s political persuasions); Neal Devins &
Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432111 [https://perma.cc/97ST-2B5T]
(examining the effects of party polarization on the Supreme Court over
time).

98.

Joan Biskupic, John Roberts Gets Another Chance for a Conservative
Legacy, CNN (Nov. 10, 2016, 2:42 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/
09/politics/us-supreme-court-john-roberts/ [https://perma.cc/NF9X-V5Q5].

99.

See supra Part II.A.

100. See Clayton & Pickerill II, supra note 42, at 1403–06 (describing Reagan’s
influence on drug laws).
101. See supra Part II.A.
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III. Analysis
In this Part, we replicate much of Pickerill’s analysis of the votes
and outcomes of cases involving economic regulations and labor issues
through the 2015 term of the Court. 102 However, we also analyze the
Court’s 5–4 decisions in order to assess the impact of polarization on
the Court. In order to assess the behavior of the Roberts Court toward
business interests, we analyzed data from the U.S. Supreme Court
Database (the “Database”). 103 The Database codes numerous variables
for every Supreme Court decision from the beginning of the Vinson
Court through the end of the 2015 term of the Roberts Court. 104 Among
the many variables included in the database are the type of issue
involved in the case, the attitudinal, or ideological, direction of each
decision, and the direction of individual justice’s vote in each case.105
Votes in favor of business interests are coded as being in the “conservative” direction, and votes in favor of government regulation, unions,
or labor interests are coded as being in the “liberal” direction. 106
We selected cases that were argued before the Court, decided on
the merits, and involved the issue areas of “union activity” and “economic activity.” 107 Union activity cases involve arbitration in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations, union antitrust, closed shop litigation, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, union membership disputes, and a host
of other labor-management disputes. Economic activity cases include
antitrust, mergers, bankruptcy, liability, punitive damages, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and a wide range of other government regulations of the economy and business activity. Votes in
102. See Pickerill, supra note 37 (exploring the Court’s decisions based on its
ideological composition); Pickerill, supra note 45 (analyzing the Court’s
decisions and voting patterns in business-oriented cases).
103. The Supreme Court Database, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, https://scdb.
wustl.edu/index.php [https://perma.cc/53CD-ZRPW] (last visited Mar. 4,
2017).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. We understand that some may object to the use of these ideological labels
in this manner, but this approach follows the conventions of analysis of
judicial behavior in political science and provides a simple and fairly clear
way for readers to understand the results of our analysis.
107. The union activity issue area includes, among other issues, cases involving
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and
a range of labor-management disputes. The economic activity code includes
a wide range of economic regulations, and includes antitrust, bankruptcy,
mergers, patents, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, and
liability and punitive damages.
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these cases are coded as “conservative” for votes in favor of business
interests and against government regulation or union authority, and
conversely, they are coded as being in the “liberal” direction for votes
in favor of government regulation of economic activity or union authority and against the interests of private businesses. 108
If we want to know if and how the Roberts Court compares to
previous courts, a logical starting point is to examine how the behavior
of the newest justices differs from their predecessors, if at all. We
analyze the individual votes of Rehnquist and Roberts, O’Connor and
Alito, Souter and Sotomayor, and Stevens and Kagan in these issue
areas by computing the total number of votes in the conservative and
liberal directions for each justice. As the results in Table 1 indicate,
four justices have been more likely to vote in the conservative, or probusiness, direction in these cases, while four have been slightly more
likely to vote against business interests.

108. The Supreme Court database has been criticized, especially with respect to
the coding of legal provisions. See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity:
Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 Hastings
L.J. 477 (2009) (discussing the shortcomings of the Supreme Court database). While we agree with some of the criticisms of the way law is treated
(and sometimes ignored) in the database, it remains a useful tool for analyzing general trends in Supreme Court outcomes in broad issue areas. It is
possible, indeed probable, that the issue areas of economic and union activity
are both under inclusive and over inclusive (that is, they may not include
every case the Court has ever decided with business implications, and they
may include some cases that do not directly implicate pro- or anti-business
legal analysis). However, given that much of the commentary—by both
Court supporters and Court detractors—on the relationship between the
Roberts Court and (big) business is indeed based on outcomes, analysis of
those outcomes at an aggregate level is still useful. We understand it is almost certainly true that not all cases analyzed here are equally as important
as one another, and that interpretive analysis is necessary to tease out which,
if any, of the Roberts Court decisions are likely to have significant implications
for future doctrinal development. Nonetheless, the database is useful for our
purposes here because it codes the Supreme Court outcomes in a consistent
manner over time.
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Table 1. Direction of Votes by Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor,
Roberts, Alito, Souter and Sotomayor in Union and
Economic Activity Cases
UNION
ECONOMIC
COMBINED
JUSTICE
ACTIVITY
ACTIVITY
TOTAL
conser liberal conserv liberal
conser liberal
vative
ative
vative
Rehnquist

85
(58%)

61
(42%)

387
(53%)

337
(47%)

472
(54%)

398
(46%)

Roberts

12
(63%)

7
(37%)

97
(55%)

79
(45%)

109
(56%)

86
(44%)

O’Connor

51
(59%)

36
(41%)

248
(53%)

217
(47%)

299
(54%)

253
(46%)

Alito

13
(72%)

5
(28%)

99
(58%)

71
(42%)

112
(60%)

76
(40%)

Souter

16
(44%)

20
(56%)

140
(46%)

166
(54%)

156
(46%)

186
(54%)

Sotomayor

6
(40%)

9
(60%)

55
(50%)

56
(50%)

61
(48%)

65
(52%)

Stevens

47
(37%)

80
(63%)

307
(44%)

391
(56%)

354
(43%)

471
(57%)

Kagan

4
7
48
49
52
56
(36%) (56%) (48%)
(52%)
(48%) (52%)
Rehnquist and O’Connor each voted in the conservative, or probusiness, direction in most of the decisions involving union activity and
economic activity during their time on the Court. As the far right-hand
column of Table 1 indicates, Rehnquist voted in the conservative
direction in 472 of 870 decisions, or fifty-four percent of the time, while
O’Connor voted in the conservative direction in 318 of 551 decisions,
also fifty-four percent of the time, in cases involving union or economic
activity. Roberts has voted in the conservative direction in 109 of 195
decisions, or fifty-six percent of the time, while Alito has voted in the
conservative direction in 112 of 188 of these decisions, or sixty percent
of the time; in other words, Roberts and Alito were slightly more likely
to vote in a pro-business than the justices they replaced. Unlike these
four more conservative justices, Souter, Sotomayor, Stevens, and Kagan
voted in the liberal direction, against business interests, a little more
than half the time. Souter voted in the liberal direction in 156 of 342
decisions, or about fifty-four percent of the time, and Sotomayor voted

714

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017
The Roberts Court and Economic Issues in an Era of Polarization

in the liberal direction in 61 of 126 decisions, or about fifty-two percent
of the time. Similarly, Stevens voted in the liberal direction in 471 of
825, or fifty-seven percent of the time, and Kagan voted in the liberal
direction 56 of 108 decisions, or about fifty-two percent of the time.
Given that the Roberts Court was initially delineated by the
appointment of Roberts as Chief Justice in September 2005, and Alito’s
nomination was confirmed a few months later in the same term in
January 2006, Roberts and Alito have voted in fewer cases than
Rehnquist and O’Connor. And Sotomayor and Kagan have cast even
fewer votes. Thus, it is important to be cautious in drawing conclusions
from their votes so far. While we must be cautious in making inferences,
these data points do constitute the population of cases in these issue
areas through the end of the 2016 term; thus, we can, at a minimum,
draw some conclusions about the first decade of the Roberts Court,
including President Obama’s appointments to the Court. The analysis
in this Part indicates that Roberts and Alito were slightly more likely
to vote in the conservative direction than the two justices they replaced;
Sotomayor and Kagan voted in the liberal direction a little less than
the justices they replaced, but they were still more likely to vote in the
liberal rather than conservative direction.
Based on the analysis of the newest justices to the Court, the ideological balance of the Court does not seem to have shifted much as a
result of the membership changes. The next step of the inquiry is to
ask how the membership change on the Court has affected outcomes in
business-oriented cases. Therefore, our analysis moves from comparing
the votes of individual justices on the Court to the outcomes of the
Court’s decisions over time.
Table 2 reports the direction of these decisions for the Vinson,
Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts. The results show that
the Roberts Court’s decisions have resulted in a higher proportion of
pro-business outcomes than previous periods, as demarcated by chief
justice. While only forty-four percent of Vinson Court decisions and
twenty-seven percent of the Warren Court decisions in union activity
and economic activity cases were in the conservative direction, the percentage increased in subsequent Courts, to forty-seven percent during
the Burger Court, fifty-one percent in the Rehnquist Court, and finally,
fifty-nine percent in the Roberts Court. In the economic activity issue
area alone, the Roberts Court has decided fifty-eight percent of cases
in the conservative direction, compared to fifty percent during the
Rehnquist Court, forty-eight percent during the Burger Court, twentyseven percent during the Warren Court, and forty-one percent during
the Vinson Court.
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Table 2. Direction of Supreme Court Outcomes in Union and
Economic Activity Cases by Chief Justice (through the 2015 term) 109
CHIEF
UNION
ECONOMIC
COMBINED
JUSTICE
ACTIVITY
ACTIVITY
TOTAL
conserv liberal conserv liberal conserv liberal
ative
ative
ative
Vinson
23
18
93
132
116
150
Court
(56%)
(44%) (41%)
(59%) (44%)
(56%)
Warren
Court

41
(32%)

89
(68%)

134
(27%)

355
(73%)

170
(27%)

453
(73%)

Burger
Court

48
(44%)

61
(56%)

211
(48%)

230
(52%)

259
(47%)

291
(53%)

Rehnquist
Court

31
(57%)

23
(43%)

171
(50%)

171
(40%)

202
(51%)

194
(49%)

Roberts
12
5
105
75
117
82
Court
(63%)
(37%) (58%)
(42%) (59%)
(41%)
And so the Roberts Court as a whole appears to be more likely to
vote in the conservative direction than the Court under the previous
four chief justices, which is consistent with much of the conventional
wisdom about the Roberts Court becoming more business-friendly than
Courts in previous eras. It has also been suggested by some commentators that the Roberts Court is also accepting more business cases.110
Table 3 reports the total number of Supreme Court decisions and the
proportion of those decisions that were union or economic activity cases
by chief justice. As Table 3 indicates, the proportion of the Court’s
docket involving union activity has been on the decline for decades, and
the Roberts Court has followed suit, constituting only about two percent of its docket. Twenty-one percent of the Roberts Court decisions
have been in the economic activity issue area, which is only slightly up
from seventeen and sixteen percent in the Rehnquist and Burger
Courts, respectively, but is still less than the Warren and Vinson
Courts, at twenty-two and twenty-nine percent, respectively.

109. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding errors.
110. Rosen, supra note 1.
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Table 3. Union and Economic Activity Cases as Proportion of
Court Agenda
CHIEF
UNION
ECONOMIC
JUSTICE
ACTIVITY
ACTIVITY
TOTAL
(% of N)
(% of N)
(% of N)
Vinson Court
(N=786)

41 (5%)

225 (29%)

266 (34%)

Warren Court
(N=2189)

130 (6%)

479 (22%)

609 (28%)

Burger Court
(N=2798)

109 (4%)

441 (16%)

550 (20%)

Rehnquist
Court (N=2029)

54 (3%)

342 (17%)

396 (20%)

Roberts Court
17 (2%)
180 (21%)
197 (23%)
(N=867)
Although the analysis so far does suggest that the Roberts Court
has ruled against government regulation of the economy and labor more
frequently than its predecessors, the political regimes approach for understanding shifts on the Court requires a different analytical approach.
Rather than adopt the chief justice as the unit of analysis, we demark
time periods based on presidents and their first appointment to the
Court. Thus, we analyzed outcomes during periods beginning with the
first Supreme Court appointment of Harry S. Truman (Fred Vinson in
1946), Dwight Eisenhower (Earl Warren in 1953), Richard Nixon
(Warren Burger in 1969), Ronald Reagan (Sandra Day O’Connor in
1981), Bill Clinton (Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1993), George W. Bush
(John Roberts in 2005), and Barack Obama (Sotomayor in 2009). Each
period—until the appointment of John Roberts in 2005—spans roughly
the same amount of time, twelve or thirteen years. 111
As Table 4 shows, the trend in the Court’s pro-business orientation
began with President Nixon’s appointments. While the Court decided
fifty-six percent of union and economic cases in a liberal (pro-union or
pro-government regulation) direction from Truman’s appointment of
Vinson in 1946 until Eisenhower’s appointment of Warren in 1953, and
seventy-three percent in the liberal direction from Warren’s appointment until Nixon’s appointment of Burger in 1969, it decided only fiftythree percent in the liberal direction from the appointment of Burger
until Reagan’s appointment of O’Connor in 1981. After 1981, the Court
continued to trend in a pro-business direction in these cases, and be-

111.

Supreme Court of the U.S., supra note 96.
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tween 1981 and Clinton’s appointment of Ginsburg, the Court was almost evenly split, deciding forty-nine percent in the liberal direction
and fifty-one percent conservative (or pro-business) direction. From
Clinton’s appointment of Ginsburg in 1993 until Bush’s appointment
of John Roberts in 2005, the Court continued the trend and decided
fifty-four percent of these cases in the conservative direction. From the
appointment of Roberts until Obama’s appointment of Sotomayor in
2009, the Court decided sixty-one percent in the conservative direction,
and since Sotomayor’s appointment, the Court has decided fifty-seven
percent of these cases in the conservative direction.
Table 4. Direction of Supreme Court Outcomes in Union and
Economic Activity Cases based on first Supreme Court
Appointment of Presidents 112
President
UNION
ECONOMIC
COMBINED
(Justice
ACTIVITY
ACTIVITY
TOTAL
appointed)
conserv liberal conserv liberal conserv liberal
ative
ative
ative
Truman1946
(Vinson)

23
(56%)

18
(44%)

93
(41%)

132
(59%)

116
(44%)

150
(56%)

Eisenhower1953
(Warren)

42
(32%)

89
(68%)

128
(26%)

364
(74%)

170
(27%)

453
(73%)

Nixon- 1969
(Burger)

38
(49%)

39
(51%)

146
(46%)

168
(54%)

184
(47%)

207
(53%)

Reagan1981
(O’Connor)

30
(45%)

36
(55%)

158
(53%)

142
(47%)

188
(51%)

178
(49%)

Clinton1993
(Ginsburg)

11
(55%)

9
(45%)

99
(54%)

84
(46%)

110
(54%)

93
(46%)

Bush-2005
(Roberts)

2
(50%)

2
(50%)

37
(62%)

23
(38%)

39
(61%)

25
(39%)

Obama-2009
(Sotomayor)

10
(67%)

5
(33%)

66
(56%)

52
(44%)

76
(57%)

57
(43%)

112 Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding errors.
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Although it may be tempting by some to attribute the evolution of
a pro-business Supreme Court solely to something unique about the
Roberts Court, the evidence suggests that would be an oversimplification. An underlying cause of the shift is best explained by nature of
regime politics over time. And thus, the key lesson here is to understand
that while the Roberts Court has, in the aggregate, trended in a probusiness direction, it is not true that the Court’s pro-business orientation is a dramatic departure from its predecessors. This fact is amplified
when we analyze the Court’s decisions using theoretically motivated
historical periods as our unit of analysis instead of the chief justice, as
Table 4 demonstrates. It is almost certainly the case that justices’ views
over time came to reflect the growing political consensus among the
presidents who appointed them over time.
Although we think the Roberts Court’s cases involving economic
and labor issues can largely be explained by political developments, in
the previous section we noted while the American regime became more
conservative as a result of the 1968 and 1980 elections, the period has
also been characterized by divided government as well as ideological
and partisan polarization. In Table 5 we analyze decisions in economic
and union cases in which the Court was divided 5–4.
Table 5. Direction of decisions in 5–4 cases from the Vinson
Court to the Roberts Court
CHIEF
UNION
ECONOMIC
COMBINED
JUSTICE ACTIVITY
ACTIVITY
TOTAL
conserv liberal conserv liberal conserv liberal
ative
ative
ative
Vinson
2
2
93
132
95
134
Court
(50%)
(50%) (41%)
(59%) (41%)
(59%)
Warren
Court

3
(38%)

5
(63%)

134
(27%)

355
(73%)

137
(28%)

360
(74%)

Burger
Court

15
(63%)

9
(38%)

28
(54%)

23
(44%)

43
(66%)

32
(34%)

Rehnquist
Court

6
(55%)

5
(46%)

28
(70%)

12
(30%)

34
(67%)

17
(33%)

Roberts
4
0
15
3
19
3
Court
(100%) (37%) (83%)
(17%) (86%)
(14%)
While fifty-nine and seventy-four percent of the 5–4 decisions in the
Vinson and Warren Courts, respectively were in the liberal direction,
sixty-six and sixty-seven percent of 5–4 decisions in the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, respectively, were in the conservative direction. And
eighty-six percent of the 5–4 decisions in the Roberts Court were in the
conservative direction. This suggests that while the Court’s shift in a
pro-business direction over time mirrors the influence of conservatism
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over the past four or five decades, the Court is also divided in a way
that reflects broader political divisions in the country.

Conclusion
We agree with conclusions that in general, the Roberts Court seems
to be more “pro-business” than previous Courts. At an aggregate level,
our empirical analysis is consistent with that of Epstein, Landes, and
Posner. 113 Whether one analyzes cases based on business entities as litigants or based on the issue areas of economic and union activity, the
Roberts Court has been more likely to rule in a direction that favors
business interests than previous courts. However, we also agree that the
aggregation of outcomes and votes cannot tell the complete story. We
agree with legal scholars that not all legal doctrine is created equally,
and the outcomes and votes of the justices cannot explain whether the
Court’s holdings in particular doctrinal areas will have favorable effects
for business interests in the future. Both types of analyses are essential
for a fuller understanding of the Court’s decisions involving economic
issues, or any other issues for that matter.
We also argue that it is a mistake to use the chief justice as the
unit of analysis for understanding legal change on the Court. Because
legal change is often a function of political change and regime politics,
it makes more sense to analyze the Court’s decisions across and within
political regimes and political time. Our analysis indicates that as the
New Right Regime emerged, the Court gradually adopted a more
business-friendly position—and that trend began long before John
Roberts was appointed Chief Justice. Moreover, although the Court
gradually embraced regime values regarding economic policy over time,
it also reflects the divisions and polarization that characterized the U.S.
federal government during the same time period.

113. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 1469–72 (summarizing Epstein,
Landes, and Posner’s findings concerning the Roberts Court’s favorability
to business).
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